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Abstract
In a recent note (arXiv:1209.2423) Renner claims that the criticisms of Hirota and Yuen on the security
foundation of quantum key distribution arose from a logical mistake. In this paper it is shown that Renner
misrepresents the claims of Yuen and also Hirota while adopting one main theorem of Yuen in lieu of his
own previous error. This leads to his incoherent position which ignores quantitative security criterion levels
that undermine the current security claims, a main point of the Yuen and Hirota criticisms. This security
criterion issue has never been properly addressed in the literature and is here fully discussed, as are several
common misconceptions on QKD security. Other foundational issues are touched upon to bring out further
the present precarious state of quantum key distribution security proofs.
I INTRODUCTION
In this paper we will respond to the recent Reply pa-
per by Renner [1] that the criticisms of Yuen [2-5]
and Hirota [6] on the security of quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) protocols are derived from a logical
error. While Hirota could speak for himself, some
related points in his paper would be included in our
discussion. Renner explicitly attributes an equivo-
cal claim to us, and by an incorrect argument in a
footnote, claims to produce a counter-example to our
conclusion. In truth, the precise form of our claim
has been repeatedly given in [2-5]. Rather, Renner
made a fundamental error in [7-8] which has become
the standard interpretation of the trace distance cri-
terion d widely employed in QKD. This incorrect in-
terpretation leads to the current prevalent QKD secu-
rity claim that the generated key K has a probability
p ≥ 1− d of being ideal [9-11]. In actuality, K is not
ideal with probability 1 for d > 0 and may have a
probability d of being found in total by an attacker
Eve [2-5]. As brought out in detail in section III, the
∗This is a slightly revised version of arXiv:1210.2804v1 and
is identical to v2. It is going to appear in Quantum ICT Re-
search Institute Bulletin of Tamagawa University, vol.3, no-1,
p.1, 2013.
correct meaning of d gives a much weaker security
guarantee than the wrong interpretation in general.
It is the consequence of this error in concrete QKD
protocols that Yuen and Hirota pointed out, which
is beyond rational dispute as will be shown in this
paper.
Security is a quantitative issue. The exact level one
has for a given l-bit key K is crucially important. In
[1] l is taken to be 106 and d = 10−20. There are two
sorts of security, “raw security” [3] before K is used
and composition security where Eve has additional
information about it when K is used, for example
from a known-plaintext attack. In raw security, the
ideal situation occurs when K has the uniform dis-
tribution U to Eve. Since the earlier days of QKD
[12], “unconditional security” means the security re-
sult holds against all attacks allowed by the laws of
quantum physics, with quantitative information the-
oretic security level that can be made arbitrarily close
to ideal through a security parameter. If d is the max-
imum failure probability with “failure” meaning the
key is not ideal [7-11], security would be perfect with
a large probability p ≥ 1− d, but that is false. When
K has a distribution P to Eve, its quality is often
measured by a single-number security criterion, say
the variational distance δ(P,U) between P and U .
1
Since δ or d is not a bound on 1 − p, operational se-
curity meaning has to be given to them through Eve’s
probabilities of success in estimating various portions
of K and through Eve’s average bit error rate (BER)
[2-5].
This paper would provide the details to elaborate
on the following:
(1) What Renner Claimed Before The Reply —
The trace distance d is defined in (TD) of [1] with
(TD) meaning d ≤ ǫ, equation (1) of [1] says
(TD)→ (UC secrecy) (1)
In [7-11] before this Reply paper [1], UC secrecy
(of level at least ǫ, or “ǫ-secrecy”) means the gen-
erated K is ideal with probability p ≥ 1−ǫ. This
is often phrased in terms of the “failure probabil-
ity” 1 − p being less than ǫ. Thus, with d inter-
preted as the maximum failure probability [7-11],
(1) is obtained to guarantee ǫ-secrecy when the
level of d is bounded by ǫ.
(2) What Yuen And Hirota Claimed —
It was shown [2-5] that Renner’s interpretation of
d is incorrect and in fact K is not uniform with
probability 1 when d > 0, i.e., p = 0. Further-
more, the levels of d obtained in concrete pro-
tocols, in theory [13] not to say in experiment
[14], imply K is very poor compared to U [2-6],
for both raw and known-plaintext attack security
and for both Eve’s sequence success probabilities
and BER.
(3) What Renner Claimed In His Reply —
The meaning of (1) is now equivocal in [1]. In
paragraph two, UC secrecy is still claimed to be
“ǫ-secret” with a failure probability ≤ ǫ, but the
explanation of failure probability in footnote [14]
is given in terms of the correct sequence probabil-
ity meaning of d first described in [5] but with no
reference. The BER meaning is not given. These
two interpretations of UC secrecy in [1] are con-
tradictory, as indicated in point (2) above. By
an arbitrary stipulation in footnote [15], it is de-
clared in [1] that d = 10−20 for an l = 106 bit
key is sufficiently secure. Together with distort-
ing our correct claim that the condition (HY)
means the key is near-uniform to that it is nec-
essary for security, a “logical error” on Yuen and
Hirota is manufactured in [1] through a counter-
example in footnote [19]. This counter-example
itself is infused with error and confusion, includ-
ing the same conceptual confusion that leads to
the error described in (1) above.
(4) What Is Wrong With The Security Claim In [1]
—
In addition to the above point (2) there are
fundamental problems on the claims in [1] for
d = 10−20 and l = 106. Since K is then far
from uniform, it cannot be used to subtract for
leakEC , Eve’s information gain from error cor-
rection, that is employed in all recent security
proofs. Also, why is such d level “sufficient” for
security? When K is not near-uniform, only the
users in a specific application can decide whether
a given d level is sufficient. It cannot be pre-
scribed in advance at d = 10−20. It is the re-
sponsibility of the security analyst to spell out
clearly the key rate and security level tradeoff.
Note that according to the most up to date the-
oretical analysis of single-photon BB84 in [13],
d = 10−20 is nowhere to be found. Already in
their presented results the key rate is reduced to
effectively zero at d = 10−14, with a one-bit K
generated before message authentication bits are
accounted for.
When the average guarantee in the security
proofs is converted to individual guarantee nec-
essary for security claim on an individual system,
the level is reduced from d to d1/3 for Eve’s se-
quence success probabilities [4]. Thus, d = 10−20
[1] reduces to d1/3 > 10−7. For d = 10−14 [13],
d1/3 > 10−5 and for d = 10−6 [14], d1/3 = 10−2.
These are poor to very poor security guarantees
for any application, and they remain so even un-
der the wrong interpretation. Such quantitative
issues are among the main claims of [2-6] not ad-
dressed in [1].
(5) What Are The Other QKD Security Foundation
Issues —
There are many other basic problems in the
known QKD security proofs that have been
raised additionally in [15-19] but not touched
upon in [1] despite its title and references. There
are also several common but fundamental mis-
conceptions in QKD security that should be clar-
ified. A most significant misconception is that
there is a security parameter in QKD protocols
that can bring security to an arbitrarily good
level if the key rate is below a certain threshold.
In this paper, we will explain points (1)-(5) in de-
tail. In section II we will explain the above criterion
issue to settle the matter once for all. We will start
by dispelling a common misconception that QKD se-
curity is guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics,
either no-cloning or whatever Uncertainty Relation.
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The necessary condition for operational quantitative
security will be given. We will describe the severe
reduction of the guaranteed d level to d1/3, and the
importance of bringing Eve’s BER on K close to 1/2.
While many details on the points about d itself can
be found from [2-5], in section III we will make just
one basic point on the error of interpreting d as max-
imum failure probability, namely a new fundamental
argument on why the ‘proof’ of such an interpreta-
tion given in [7-8] involving a joint distribution is not
only invalid but is in fact irrelevant to the issue. All
the security points raised in [1] will be addressed. In
section IV various security proof issues concerning
BB84 type protocols will be touched upon. We will
bring out the inevitable exchange of key rate and se-
curity level in QKD systems, with the important con-
sequence that there is no security parameter in QKD
protocols that would render it arbitrarily secure for a
fixed key rate. We will point out the incorrect step of
subtracting leakEC to account for information leak
due to error correction. Some common misconcep-
tions about QKD security are summarized in section
V.
The upshot is that the security foundation of QKD
is indeed very much shaken. General security cannot
be established by experiments and can only be proved
theoretically. The present predicament is that it is
not clear why and how a concrete QKD protocol can
be proved secure in principle.
II QKD SECURITY CRITE-
RION AND NECESSARY
SECURITY CONDITIONS
In a QKD protocol of the BB84 type [20] two users A
and B try to establish a sequence of secret bits, the
generated key K, between themselves that no eaves-
dropper Eve can know even with any active attack.
The security is often claimed to be based on the laws
of quantum physics as if the latter have to be vio-
lated in order for Eve to succeed. It is clear that
quantum no-cloning is a necessary but far from suf-
ficient condition for security. In particular, the pos-
sibility of approximate cloning shows the issue is a
more complicated quantitative one. The more preva-
lent intuitive security idea is quantum disturbance-
information trade-off, that the users could tell the
presence of Eve by monitoring the system disturbance
level if she gains an amount of “information” on K
exceeding a given design level. Indeed, intrusion level
estimation is a key part of all the typical QKD ap-
proaches. Henceforth the term QKD is used with
the understanding that intrusion level estimation is
involved.
To get sizable disturbance relative to the signal
that can be readily estimated in QKD, the signal level
needs to be low, say a single photon in BB84. Thus,
the disturbance induced by Eve is easily masked by
other unavoidable disturbance in a concrete realis-
tic system even when such imperfection is small for
other purposes. Furthermore, in an active attack Eve
could in principle transform the quantum signals in
many different ways and the users have to estimate
her information gain under a given level of tolerable
disturbance. It is now clear that security is a quan-
titative and complicated matter, and that there is no
simple intuitive reason why any net key bits can be
generated in QKD with whatever security, especially
when the bits used for message authentication neces-
sary for defending against man-in-the-middle attack
are counted.
What security criterion should one use to measure
the quantitative security level and why? In the liter-
ature this issue has never been correctly addressed.
The mutual (accessible) information was used from
the beginning but was found to contain a major loop-
hole [21,22] and is by now largely abandoned. The
trace distance criterion d [23,7-8] is at present nearly
universally employed in QKD security analysis which
is cited in [1] as the criterion that leads to “UC se-
crecy”.
What is the level of d needed for UC secrecy?
While one can distinguish perfect secrecy from UC
secrecy, adequate UC security cannot be established
by mere terminology or definition. It appears that
the QKD security criterion is often thought to be a
matter of choice by the designer, a wrong conception
as we show presently. In [5] the following criteria
are given in terms of Eve’s optimal probabilities p1
of successfully estimating various subsets of K from
her attack. For raw security [3] where Eve only has
information from the key generation process, the con-
ditions are, with K∗ being any subset of K and for
any value k∗ of K∗,
p1(k
∗) ≤ 2−|K
∗| + ǫ′ (2)
for some chosen level ǫ′ [5]. Under known-plaintext
attack where Eve knows a subset segment K1 = k1
of K and estimates a subset K∗2 in the rest of K, the
condition is, for some level of ǫ′′,
p1(k
∗
2
|K1 = k1) ≤ 2
−|K∗
2
| + ǫ′′ (3)
These probabilities have direct operational meaning
in contrast to theoretical entities such as d or mutual
information. The users have to decide what the ǫ′ and
3
ǫ′′ are for the cryptosystem to be sufficiently secure
operationally in a particular application. In particu-
lar, if these levels cannot be guaranteed it means Eve
may be able to guess the key portion K∗ or K∗
2
with
a probability exceeding the prescribed level chosen by
the users, thus the cryptosystem is not proven secure
to its operational specification! Hence (2)-(3) are nec-
essary conditions for security. They are not sufficient
for one-time pad use of K, as discussed later.
Among different composition security situations,
known-plaintext attacks have to be included in QKD
security proofs. As discussed in [3], the raw security
of conventional symmetric-key ciphers is far better
than that of concrete QKD systems.
As explained in [2], Eve derives from her probe
measurement a whole distribution P on all the 2l
possible K values. A single-number criterion merely
expresses a constraint on P , but P itself should be
compared to U for operational security guarantees.
In particular, one has the form given in the left sides
of (2)-(3) above for Eve’s sequence success probabil-
ities. In the ideal case, ǫ′ = ǫ′′ = 0 in (2)-(3). The
levels ǫ′ and ǫ′′ can be stipulated by the system de-
signer for different security needs. Under a d ≤ ǫ
guarantee, (2)-(3) hold only when averaged over all
relevant key values [5] with ǫ′ = ǫ′′ = ǫ.
From Markov inequality [24] such average guaran-
tee can be converted into the individual guarantees
(2)-(3) for proper comparison with U [25]. Opera-
tionally, average guarantee is not sufficient also be-
cause “failure probability” of some sort is required in
the quality control of individual items in any produc-
tion system. Thus, we have (2)-(3) with
ǫ′ = ǫ′′ = d1/3 (4)
due to averaging of d with respect to the possible K
values and the privacy amplification codes given in
security proofs [4,5].
Our averaged conditions [5] are obtained for the
classical variational distance [24] which is bounded
by d upon measurement from Eve. They do not seem
to have appeared before [26] in either the classical
or quantum literature other than deterministic bit
leak in raw security brought up in [3]. Probabilis-
tic bit leaks of any level are covered in (2)-(3), and
such leaks must also be guaranteed by quantitative
bounds. Note that equality can be achieved for these
bounds, i.e., there are Eve’s distributions on K com-
patible with the d ≤ ǫ guarantee which satisfy (2)-(3)
with equality [2-5]. This shows they can be used with
equality to measure the quantitative security guaran-
tee on K.
What would be a sufficient condition for security?
If ǫ’ and ǫ” are not small in the right scale with re-
spect to l, (2)-(3) may not be sufficient depending on
the application. Recall that the comparison reference
of the distribution P of K is U . When K is used in
one-time pad form, in addition to (2)-(3) Eve’s aver-
age BER pb in her estimate of the K bits has to be
close to 1/2 for security. (Note that pb accounts for
the correlation between the bits in K from its defini-
tion [4].) This is well known in data communications
and is easily seen, that an incorrect sequence estimate
on K may nevertheless produce a preponderance of
correctlyy estimated key bits similar to what one may
get from a biased a priori distribution of K that is
different from U . It turns out that [4] only
1
2
− pb ≤ d
1
4 /2
√
log2 e (5)
can be guaranteed for the whole K in raw security,
there is no subset guarantee for either raw or known-
plaintext attack security. However, if d ∼ 2−l for l≫
1 so that K is near-uniform, it appears K should be
quantitatively secure for all conceivable applications
as stated in [15]. Note that no composition security
argument from the mere form of d [23] can guarantee
pb under known-plaintext attacks [4], while the wrong
interpretation can [11], because K is U with a high
probability p ≥ 1− d.
III THE INCORRECT IN-
TERPRETATION OF d
AND CLASSICAL CRYP-
TOGRAPHY
The prevalent interpretation is that d gives the prob-
ability that K is different from U with Eve’s probe
disconnected from K and thus giving composition se-
curity also [7-11]. This interpretation has repeatedly
been pointed out to be incorrect in [2-5] to no avail,
until the appearance of [1], which no longer cites such
an interpretation but instead the correct one! The
origin of the error comes from the interpretation of
the variational distance δ(P,Q),
δ(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
i
|Pi −Qi| (6)
between two classical probability distributions P and
Q which is given to Proposition 2.1.1 in [7], that
“the two settings described by P and P ′, respectively,
cannot differ with probability more than ǫ.” In our
present notation or that of [8], P ′ = Q, and d is in-
terpreted equivalently from Lemma 1 of [8] as the
“probability that two random experiments described
4
by P and Q, respectively, are different”. We would
not repeat the reasons and simple counter-examples
[2-5] on why this interpretation is wrong. It does not
follow from the mathematical statement of his Propo-
sition 2.1.1, or the equivalent Lemma 1 of [8], through
a joint distribution which gives P and Q as marginals,
but rather from conceptual and verbal confusions. In-
stead, we point out here that any such joint distribu-
tion is irrelevant to the meaning of δ(P,Q). This is
simply because the marginal distribution is just P re-
gardless of what the underlying space of P is joined
to. P does not suddenly become Q with a probablity
δ(P,Q) in the presence of the given joint distribution.
The wrong interpretation arose from basic conceptual
confusions about the relation of probability concepts
to the real world. It is amazing that it has perpetu-
ated as far and as long as it has.
The variational distance is a well studied concept
and nowhere else could one find such a strong inter-
pretation as given in [7-8]. In particular, d is not so
interpreted in [23]. Indeed, it is shown in [3] and eas-
ily seen from (6) that when d > 0, the distribution
of K is not U with probability 1 (no probability is-
sue here really) instead of d. Subtle and equivocal
words in [1] may suggest that the wrong and cor-
rect interpretations of d (equivalently δ) are similar.
Although the two interpretations quantitatively con-
tradict each other, one may perhaps think they are
numerically close. In particular, since “failure” in-
cludes the event where the whole K is compromised,
it is important to understand the difference between
the two interpretations precisely, as follows.
Prior to ref [5], which correctly proves known-
plaintext attack security under d ≤ ǫ for the
first time, in the literature there are two incor-
rect/incomplete proofs of universal composition se-
curity. One of them [11] is invalid since it utilizes the
wrong interpretation of d. With (3) from [5], known-
plaintext attack security is established for Eve’s se-
quence success probabilities but there is no simi-
lar guarantee for Eve’s BER. In contrast, under the
wrong interpretation Eve’s BER pb =
1
2
with a prob-
ability ≥ 1−d for every k, on which counter-examples
are easily constructed. In general, each different com-
position situation has to be treated under the correct
meaning of d for quantitative guarantee, which can-
not be given by just d or δ since they are not opera-
tional criteria. This fact alone shows the composition
security claim on d in [23] in incomplete or invalid,
since mathematical representation of operation secu-
rity is lacking.
A further difference is that if K is not at least near
uniform, one cannot use it to subtract for the bits
leakEC , given by (8) in section IV, while such bits
need to be used in the middle of a valid security proof.
Another difference is that Markov inequality needs to
be applied only once under the wrong interpretation
since there is no K-average needed, which results in
d1/2 instead of d1/3 in (4).
Even assuming the wrong interpretation is true,
the relatively large value of d that can be obtained
is quite worrysome. For d = 10−20, the operational
guarantee (2)-(3) for a 106 bit key is not better than
that of a 66 bit key! An arbitrary reason of sys-
tem imperfection level given in footnote [15] of [1]
is used to justify such numerical values. But why is
d = 10−20 sufficient for UC secrecy? In fact, the raw
security operational guarantee (1)-(2) for d = 10−20 is
much worse than that obtained in conventional sym-
metric key ciphers [3].
Furthermore, there is no hint that such a d level of
10−20 can be obtained in a concrete protocol. If one
takes into account Markov inequality for individual
guarantee as discussed in section II, only an effec-
tive d1/3 > 10−7 is obtained for d = 10−20 after the
K value average and privacy amplification code aver-
age are accounted for [4]. The effective d1/3 value of
> 10−7 for d = 10−20 is already very large for l = 103,
not to say l = 106. The only concrete experimen-
tal protocol with quantified security level is given in
[14,27] with effectively d = 10−6. Then d1/3 = 10−2
from [14] may entail a very drastic breach of secu-
rity. Note that the d = 10−20 level cannot even be
achieved for a positive key rate in a “tight finite-
key” analysis of single-photon BB84 [13], for which
the best d = 10−14 is obtained for l = 1! It should
be emphasized that these effective d1/3 values give
poor security guarantee even according to the wrong
interpretation. The corresponding BER guarantee of
(5) is similarly poor.
In this connection, it is important to note that the
size of d should be measured with respect to 2−l ac-
cording to the correct interpretation (2)-(3), not with
respect to 1 according to the incorrect interpretation.
This has been a major source of confusion, that since
the system is evidently secure or ideal when a crite-
rion takes the value zero hence it should be secure
for a small value of the criterion. Yes, this is correct
if “smallness” is measured in the correct scale, but 1
is not always the scale, an elementary point that is
often forgotten when relative dimensional measure is
ignored.
Similarly, the criterion d as “distinguishability ad-
vantage” is used to justify d as a security criterion
in [23], which is also the justification for using vari-
ational distance in some classical cryptography work
brought up in the last paragraph of [1]. While the
distinguishability advantage was only established for
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binary decisions, it is now established [5] for N-ary
decisions for N between 2 and 2l. However, the rel-
evant point in this connection is that the required
level ǫ in d ≤ ǫ depends on what N in the N-ary de-
cision is. A value good compared to 1
2
for N=2 may
be very inadequate relative to 1/N for N = 2l, as
we just discussed. This N-ary issue is another reason
why composition security proof has to be spelled out
precisely and quantitatively. Security is a quantita-
tive issue through and through. Further discussion of
such d meaning is given in [4].
The quantitative counter-example in [1] is irrele-
vant to begin with since we never deny (1) in its cor-
rect sense and we only insist (HY) is necessary for
a near-uniform K when l is large. It may be men-
tioned that the counter-example uses a very strict
meaning for his vague condition (HY) that neither
Yuen nor Hirota ever indicated. The construction
in the counter-example betrays the same confusion
which underlies the erroneous interpretation of d [7-
8]. In the counter-example, δ or d or ǫ is fixed at 2−l
and there is no room for another ǫ = 10−20 “by con-
struction”! This is one conspicuous example of the
several incoherences in [1].
In classical cryptography practice, encryption se-
curity is based on complexity, search for known-
plaintext attacks on symmetric key ciphers and other
computational ones in asymmetric key ciphers. The
information theoretic security we talk about here for
QKD plays no role except for one-time pad. Thus,
the claim of [1] that classical cryptography is com-
promised without a small enough d is false, for this
and the following reasons.
The bound storage model [28] with controllable in-
formation theoretic security is not used in practice
while it has a criterion related to d, but there is a
security parameter in [28] that could make it arbi-
trarily small which is not available in QKD. In par-
ticular, the key length l itself is not such a parameter
once the proper criterion is employed in QKD [2], a
point that will be elaborated in the next section IV.
On the other hand, security is not fully established
in [28] unless the criterion value goes to zero, pre-
cisely because N-ary decisions as well as Eve’s bit
error rate are not treated. In fact, security under
known-plaintext attacks, which is the real issue for
symmetric key ciphers [3], is also not treated in [28].
In public key cryptography the variational dis-
tance criterion from complexity consideration plays
no role in practice. In fact the probabilistic encryp-
tion schemes that utilize such theory is not used due
to its slow speed. Similar to [28], security for public
key is not established in principle for N-ary decisions,
Eve’s bit error rate, and for known-plaintext attacks.
The actual situation is that other than one-time
pad, no protocol in classical cryptography has been
proven secure, information theoretically or compu-
tationally. Cryptography is still very much an art.
Quantum cryptography aspires to provable security,
a lofty goal that has been repeatedly claimed to be
achieved from numerous errors of reasoning. Since se-
curity is a serious matter and cannot be established
experimentally, we should examine all the security
proof steps more carefully. A concise discussion of
such steps and the state of QKD security proofs is
given next.
IV QKD SECURITY PROOF
STATUS
There are five main steps involved in the general se-
curity proof of a BB84-type QKD protocol, assuming
the physical modelling is complete and correct:
(i) Pick a security criterion and establish its oper-
ational guarantee is adequate;
(ii) Measure the quantum bit error rate (QBER) on
the checked qubits and transfer it with proper
statistical margin to the sifted key K ′′;
(iii) Bound Eve’s relevant information on K ′′ under
an arbitrary joint attack;
(iv) Apply an open error correcting code (EEC) and
bound Eve’s information on the corrected key
K ′;
(v) Apply an open privacy amplification code
(PAC) to generate the final key K and bound
Eve’s information on K according to the cho-
sen criterion to obtain its quantitative level of
security.
Each of these five steps has been treated incor-
rectly since the early days of QKD security proofs.
At present, step (i) is almost resolved (apart from
Eve’s general bit error rate) in one way through the
criterion d via (2)-(5) above. Step (v) can be resolved
by the classical Leftover Hash Lemma [29]. We will
discuss the other three steps in turn, the main im-
pediment to progress in security proof is from steps
(iii) and (iv).
Historically the Shor-Preskill proof [30] is most
influential and widely quoted, but it is incom-
plete/incorrect for all five steps. Here it will be used
as a representative and the other security approaches
and proofs other than [13] will not be discussed. The
Shor-Preskill proof employs the mutual accessible in-
formation criterion Ia without insisting it be small
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enough. (In contrast to the impression from [21,22],
the Ia criterion is actually fine if its level is at or below
2−l for an l-bit key K [31].) The transfer of QBER is
later amended in [32] for general joint attacks, which
is still incorrect because it involves classical count-
ing instead of qubit counting. It appears that correct
quantum counting can be developed [33], which gives
wider fluctuation or lower security level with a factor
of two reduction in the exponent.
The major difficulty in QKD security proof arises
from the correlation between key bits that are intro-
duced by Eve’s active joint attack and the user’s ECC
and PAC. To account for such correlation from a joint
attack, step (iii) has mostly been achieved by some
sort of symmetrization which does not appear to be
valid. How does one get symmetry from an asymmet-
ric situation? The usual argument (see, for example,
the reduction of a general attack to collective attack
in [7]) involving an openly known permutation can-
not do any work since Eve knows it and could just
rearrange back. A new argument is used in [13] which
involves incorrect classical counting on qubits similar
to [32] and moreover, does not work for sufficiently
small d [15].
The information Eve has on the chosen ECC and
PAC are not accounted for in the Shor-Preskill proof.
In a direct development of the Shor-Preskill ap-
proach, Hayashi has recently incorporated such in-
formation for ECC [34] and PAC [35], which are yet
to be evaluated for concrete protocols under general
attack. In the meantime, the ECC information leak
expression
leakEC = h(QBER) (7)
where h(·) is the binary entropy function, is employed
by him [36] and in fact universally [9,13,37] to ac-
count for such leak. It is pointed out [15] that there
is the possibility of information leak from ECC sim-
ilar to quantum information locking leak [15] that
undermines inadequate values of accessible informa-
tion as a security criterion, and which is neglected in
the expression (7). Furthermore, (7) can be justified
only for collective attacks asymptotically. Collective
attack is extremely restrictive, Eve can launch what
is called a joint attack without any entanglement by
just attacking a portion of the key bits (which seems
to suggest already that collective attacks cannot be
optimal for any of Eve’s aim, not to mention for this
leakEC issue). Indeed, no justification for such a cru-
cial treatment of step (iv) by (7) has ever been spelled
out because there is none. It cannot be true for all
attacks if one examines its meaning [15]. This ECC
information leakage problem (iv) and also the joint
attack problem (iii) appear to be very difficult to re-
solve in QKD security proofs.
The condition (7) by itself shows that the near-
universal step of subtracting it from the generated
key bits to get the final K is invalid, unless perhaps
when the d level ofK is so small that (2)-(3) imply the
bits are nearly uniform and K functions effectively as
U . This is a problem even if the users decide that a
given large d level is sufficient for security. The se-
curity proof itself is supposedly carried out with uni-
form bits in the amount (7). Note that Even could
launch a joint attack just to invalidate (7) regard-
less of whether collective attack is optimum from the
viewpoint of her information gain on K. She may
want to minimize the users’ key rate which may not
turn out positive.
Apart from all these theory problems, the security
proof claims are often used by experimentalists to
claim security for their systems in an invalid way. For
example, the Shor-Preskill asymptotic key rate is of-
ten quoted as the system capability, with no mention
of the criterion and its quantitative level. Equally
significantly, Shor-Preskill only claimed to have es-
tablished such rate for a joint CSS code as ECC and
PAC. In [38], for example, the cascade reconciliation
protocol is used for error correction which has nu-
merous problems [39] and universal hashing is used
for PAC. However, it has never been shown that the
Shor-Preskill key rate applies to such error correction
and privacy amplification procedures.
The asymptotic convergence rate for various crite-
ria yields the actual (asymptotic) key rate for fixed
levels of d or p1 [2,25], and is not given in [24] for its
mutual information criterion. In this connection, we
would like to bring out a common misconception con-
cerning QKD security. Since [30] it is often thought
that as long as the key rate is below a certain thresh-
old, security level can be made arbitrarily close to
the ideal when the key length l is indefinitely in-
creased. That is, l is taken to be a security parame-
ter, and that is likely why only the secure key rate is
quoted in many papers including [38]. Perhaps this
is thought to be in analogy with Shannon’s Channel
Coding Theorem [24], which says that for data rate
below capacity, the error rate can be made arbitrar-
ily small for long enough block length. Sometimes
it is thought that finite privacy amplification is what
renders this untrue. We would like to point out here
that the problem is present even asymptotically for
any l →∞, as follows [2].
For key rate below a threshold, let us assume it
is indeed proved that Eve’s accessible information Ia
(or d) goes to 0 as l → ∞, exponentially as ∼ 2−λl
for some 0 < λ < 1,
d ∼ 2−λl or Ia/l ∼ 2
−λl (8)
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The situation for finite l is the same. The security
level for those l bits is very different depending on
what exactly λ is. It is near ideal for λ = 1 but
very far from ideal for λ << 1. Indeed, Eve’s max-
imum probability p1 of estimating the whole K sets
the limit on the number of uniform bits that can be
generated since p1 = 2
−n for n uniformly distributed
bits. Thus, it is the rate of p1 or equivalently Ia/l
going to zero that determines the rate of uniform key
generation, not the original key rate threshold [2,15].
It turns out the convergence rate λ in (8) is very
small for d in [13], and not evaluated for Ia/l in other
proofs except [27] which leads to an even smaller λ
[14]. With d = 10−20 and l = 106, λ ∼ 2
3
× 10−4
resulting in 66 bits guarantee of (2)-(3) for 106 bits,
or just 22 bits from (4) after Markov inequality is ap-
plied. In [13] the best d = 10−14 or d1/3 > 10−5, and
in [14] Ia/l ∼ 10
−6 equivalent to d1/3 ∼ 10−2.
One can relax uniform K to ǫ-secrecy via ǫ-smooth
entropy [40]. Intuitively, one cannot expect much
would be accomplished when ǫ is only moderately
larger than 2−l. In fact, even for very large d for a
given l, the results of [13] shows the key rate is still
very low.
Thus, the exchange of key rate and security level is
a fundamental fact in all QKD protocols, asymptotic
or finite, and l is not a security parameter. In fact,
one needs to prove that a positive exponent λ > 0
would result in (8) which is far from guaranteed. This
is especially the case when all system imperfections
and message authentication bits are taken into ac-
count. Together with the numerical values obtained
in [13], this fundamental tradeoff between key rate
and security level gives a grim picture of the useful-
ness of BB84 type protocols.
In QKD security proofs there are numerous prob-
lems associated with physical modelling that have
been ignored or neglected. We may point out the case
of general lossy channel security [16], photon number
splitting attacks on multi-photon sources and decoy
states [18], and heterodyne-resend attack in CV-QKD
[19]. Security is seriously undermined in the last two
situations against the prevalent security claims on
them. In particular, a grave issue that has been gen-
erally overlooked is to what extent the users could
accurately determine the various system parameters
such as loss, a serious robustness issue for security.
The well known detector blinding attacks [41] shows
detailed detector behavior has to be explicitly repre-
sented in a real security proof [17], but so far it has
not been done.
V COMMON MISCONCEP-
TIONS ON QKD SECU-
RITY
The list in the following corrects some major miscon-
ceptions on QKD security, most of which have been
discussed in this paper as part of our response to [1].
(a) Any single-number security criterion, other than
the wrong interpretation of d in [7,8], is not suf-
ficient for security by itself. For operationally
meaningful security guarantee, it has to be quan-
titatively reduced to bounds on Eve’s various suc-
cess probabilities in estimating segments of the
key and also her average bit error rate.
(b) One cannot prescribe, as done in [1], that some
chosen numerical level of a criterion is always suf-
ficient for security when the level is far from ideal.
It is the application user of the cryptosystem who
decides what level is adequate for a specific ap-
plication.
(c) There is a fundamental exchange between key
rate and security level. It is not the case that
security can be made arbitrarily close to ideal
for key rate below a certain threshold. It is the
cryptosystem designer’s responsibility to evalu-
ate such quantitative tradeoff. The results of [13]
give poor security level even at very low key rate.
(d) Contrary to widespread impression, there is no
valid QKD general security proof in the litera-
ture. For example, the error correction step has
never been treated correctly. The burden of proof
is on those who claim security, not on other to
produce a specific counter-example on the secu-
rity claim.
(e) As a consequence of (d) and in view of the
fundamental difficulties discussed in this paper,
QKD is at present no different in security status
from other cryptosystems under study or in use.
It does not have the advantage of having been
proved unconditionally secure in principle.
(f) The problem of complete system representation
for security claim is not a “practical security” is-
sue for the application user, but rather a basic
one. The incomplete modelling of system com-
ponent behavior, such as photodetector tempo-
ral response to different input signal levels, is not
a mere “side channel” issue but a main issue of
model completeness, without which there can be
no proof of security.
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VI CONCLUSION
It is hard to avoid the impression that Eve’s stand-
point has rarely been taken seriously in the literature
and the main concern has been to claim security. A
common mistake in general security proofs is to an-
alyze only one type of attacks but claiming uncondi-
tional security against all possible attacks. Security
is a serious matter. There are an unlimited number
of attack scenarios, thus security can only be estab-
lished theoretically if at all and the burden of proof is
on those who claim security. Attacks from the Nor-
way group [41] shows how dangerous a faulty claim
may be, with security totally compromised in an un-
expected way, a situation actually familiar in conven-
tional cryptography. When addressing security issues
it would be good to keep the following question in
mind:
How did we come to the present QKD security
predicament with endless invalid security proofs?
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I would like to thank Greg Kanter for useful discus-
sions. My work referred to in this paper was sup-
ported by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research
and the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency.
References
[1] R. Renner, Reply to Recent Scepticism About
the Foundations of Quantum Cryptography,
arXiv:1209.2423v.1 (2012).
[2] H.P. Yuen, Key Generation: Foundation and a
New Quantum Approach, IEEE J. Selected Topics
in Quantum Electronics, 15, 1630 (2009).
[3] H.P. Yuen, Fundamental Quantitative Security
in Quantum Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. A 82,
062304 (2010).
[4] H.P. Yuen, Security Significance of the Trace dis-
tance Criterion in Quantum Key Distribution,
arXiv:1109.2675v3 (2012).
[5] H.P. Yuen, Unconditional Security in Quantum
Key Distribution, arXiv:1205.5065v2 (2012).
[6] O. Hirota, Incompleteness and Limit of Quan-
tum Key Distribution Theory, arXiv:1208.2106v2
(2012).
[7] R. Renner, Security of Quantum Key Distribu-
tion, J. Quant.Inf. 6, 1 (2008); same as Ph.D the-
sis in quant-ph 0512258.
[8] R. Renner and R. Konig, Universally Compos-
able Privacy Amplification against Quantum Ad-
versaries, Second Theory of Cryptography Con-
ference (TCC), Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, vol. 3378, Springer, New York, pp. 407-425
(2005).
[9] V. Scarani, H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci, N.J. Cerf,
M. Pusek, N. Lukenhaus, and M. Peev, The Secu-
rity of Practical Quantum Key Distribution, Rev.
Mod. Phys. 81, 1301 (2009).
[10] V. Scarani and R. Renner, Quantum Cryptog-
raphy with Finite Resources: Unconditional Se-
curity Bound for Discrete-Variable Protocols with
One-Way Post-Processing, Phys. Rev. Lett. 100,
200501 (2008).
[11] J. Muller-Quade and R. Renner, Composabil-
ity in Quantum Cryptography, New J. Phys. 11,
085006 (2009).
[12] D. Mayers, “Unconditional Security in Quantum
Cryptography”, J. ACM 48, 351 (2001).
[13] M. Tomamichel, C. Lin, N. Gisin, and R.
Renner, Tight Finite-Key Analysis for Quantum
Cryptography, Nat. Commun. 3, 634 (2012).
[14] J. Hasegawa, M. Hayashi, T. Hiroshima, A.
Tanaka, and A. Tomita, Experimental Decoy
State Quantum Key Distribution with Uncon-
ditional Security Incorporating Finite Statistics,
Asian Conference on Quantum Information Sci-
ence, Kyoto, 2007; quant-ph 0705.3081.
[15] H.P. Yuen, Problem of Security Proofs and Fun-
damental Limit on Key Generation Rate in Quan-
tum Key Generation, arXiv: 1205.3820v2 (2012).
[16] H.P. Yuen, Effect of Transmission Loss on the
Fundamental Security of Quantum Key Distribu-
tion, arXiv:1109.1049v1 (2011).
[17] H.P. Yuen, Fundamental and Practical Problems
of QKD Security - The Actual and the Perceived
Situation, arXiv:1109.1066v4 (2012).
[18] H.P. Yuen, Fundamental Insecurity of Multi-
Photon Sources under Photon-Number Split-
ting Attacks in Quantum Key Distribution,
arXiv:1207.6985v3 (2012).
[19] H.P. Yuen, Fundamental Security Issues in
Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution,
arXiv:1208.5827v1 (2012).
9
[20] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden,
Quantum Cryptography, Rev. Mod. Phys., vol. 74,
pp.1 145-195, 2002.
[21] R. Konig, R. Renner, A. Bariska, and U. Mau-
rer, Small Accessible Quantum Information Does
Not Imply Security, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 140502
(2007).
[22] F. Dupuis, Florjanczyk, P. Hayden, and D. Le-
ung, Locking Classical Information, arxiv: quant-
ph 1011.1612v1, 2010.
[23] M. Ben-Or, M. Horodecki, D.W. Leung, D.
Mayers, and J. Oppenheim, Universally Compos-
able Security of Quantum Key Distribution, Sec-
ond Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC),
Lecture Notes in Comnputer Science, vol. 3378,
Springer, New York, pp.386-406 (2005); also
quant-ph 0409078.
[24] T.M. Cover and J.A. Thomas, Elements of In-
formation Theory, 2nd ed, Wiley, 2006.
[25] These individual guarantee conditions are cited
in footnote [14] of [1] as the significance of d with-
out the averaging, though averaging is complained
about in footnote [18] of [1].
[26] Thus, our condition (2)-(3) is just appropriated
in footnote [14] of [1], apparently because it gives
the correct operational significance of d while [7-
11] give an incorrect one.
[27] J. Hasegawa, M. Hayashi, T. Hiroshima, and A.
Tomita, Security Analysis of Decoy State Quan-
tum Key Distribution Incorporating Finite Statis-
tics, avXiv: 0707.3541, 2007.
[28] Y. Aumann, Y. Ding, and M. Rabin, Everlast-
ing Security in the Bounded Storage Model, IEEE
Trans. Inf. Theory 48, 1668 (2002).
[29] R. Impagliazzo and D. Zuckerman, How To Re-
cycle Random Bits, in Proc. 30th Annual IEEE
Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
pp. 248-253, 1989.
[30] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Simple Proof of Secu-
rity of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Pro-
tocol, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 (2000).
[31] H.P. Yuen, Problem of Existing Unconditional
Security Proof in Quantum Key Distribution,
arXiv:1109.1051v3 (2012).
[32] H.L. Lo, H.F. Chau, and M. Ardehali, Efficient
Quantum Key Distribution Scheme And Proof of
Its Unconditional Security, J. Cryptology, 18, 133
(2005).
[33] N. Bouman and S. Fehr, Sampling in a Quantum
Population, and Application, arXiv:0907.4246v5
(2012).
[34] M. Hayashi, Classical and Qauntum Security
Analysis Via Smoothing of Reny Entropy of Order
2, arXiv:1202.0322v2 (2012).
[35] M. Hayashi, Precie Evaluation of Leaked In-
formation with Universal Privacy Amplifica-
tion in the Presence of Quantum Attacker,
arXiv:1202.0611v1 (2012).
[36] M. Hayashi and T. Tsurumaru, Concise
and Tight Security Analysis of the Bennett-
Brassard 1984 Protocol with finite Key Length,
arXiv:1107.0589v2 (2012).
[37] V. Scarani, QKD: A Million Signal Task, arXiv:
1010.0521v1 (2010).
[38] A. Dixon, Z. Yuan, J. Dynes, A. Sharpe and A.
Shields, Continuous Operation of High Bit Rate
Quantum Key Distribution, Appl. Phys. Lett. 96,
161102 (2010).
[39] K. Yamazaki, R. Nair, and H.P. Yuen, Problem
of Cascade Protocol and Its Application to Clas-
sical and Quantum key Generation, in Proc. 8th
International Conference on Quantum Communi-
cation, Measurement and Computing, ed. by O.
Hirota, etc., NICT Press, pp.201-204, 2007.
[40] M. Tomamichel, C. Schattner, A. Smith and R.
Renner, Leftover Hashing against Quantum Side
Information, arXiv: 1002.2436, 2010.
[41] I. Gerhardt, Q. Liu, A. Lamas-Linares, J. Skaar,
C. Kurtsiefer, and V. Markov, Full-Field Imple-
mentation of a Perfect Eavesdropper on a Quan-
tum Cryptography System, Nat. Commun. 2, 349
(2011).
10
